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Introduction1
In many countries, most notably in the southern hemisphere, indige-
nous groups and traditional communities live in close interaction with their 
natural environment. Based on centuries-old experiences, they have learned 
how to make use of local animals and plants in order to cope with their 
daily needs. In many cases, their experiences are embedded in a context 
of complex socio-cultural practices that are closely associated with cosmo-
logical, epistemological, and transcendental convictions. Customary laws 
regulate the access, transmission, and diﬀusion of knowledge within the 
communities (Gudeman 1996; Rao 2006). In some cases, local commu-
nities try to keep certain elements of their knowledge secret, since they 
consider it to be sacred and thus inalienable (Interview 186). In other cases, 
they refuse to allow a commercial exploitation of their knowledge because 
of its spiritual signiﬁcance (Malayali 2009). Generally, indigenous and local 
communities insist on their right to decide by themselves and by their own 
rules the conditions under which, if at all, they are willing to disclose their 
knowledge. 
During the last 30 years, ‘traditional knowledge’2 has aroused the 
attention of scientists, corporations, and environmental groups. Both 
scientists from public research institutions and corporate actors from the 
life sciences and agriculture industry perceive traditional knowledge as a 
means with which to accelerate their research into new drugs and farming 
methods (Dutﬁeld 2011; Pandikumar et al. 2011). More recently, environ-
mental non-governmental organisations have started to make use of indig-
enous knowledge for climate protection schemes like the Clean Develop-
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ment Mechanism (CDM) or Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD) programmes (Debbarma 2006). Their varying moti-
vations notwithstanding, most external actors only perceive traditional 
knowledge as useful raw material for their own purposes, tending to ignore 
its socio-cultural ramiﬁcations and disregarding the customary rights of 
the aﬀected communities (Agrawal 2002). 
Within multiple international forums, negotiators from emerging and 
industrialised countries, industry representatives, scientists, civil society 
actors, and indigenous groups try to come to a common understanding 
on mutually acceptable standards for bio-explorations and related activi-
ties. Although there is no single international treaty that exclusively deals 
with traditional knowledge, many agreements, conventions and resolu-
tions touch upon this issue. However, the international “regime complex” 
(Raustiala/Victor 2004) contains many ambivalent, inconsistent and even 
outright contradictory prescriptions, which leaves some room for interpre-
tation during the course of domestic implementation. 
This paper addresses the impact of the international regime complex on 
national regulatory initiatives with regard to traditional knowledge. On the 
domestic level, it focusses on diverging regulatory approaches in India and 
Brazil. The Indian eco-capitalist model prioritises economic development, 
scientiﬁc research, and, albeit to a lesser degree, environmental protection. 
Brazilian regulations in this ﬁeld, in contrast, are inspired by the leitmotif 
of socioambientalismo, through which the economic and scientiﬁc exploi-
tation of traditional knowledge is balanced with the respect for indige-
nous and local communities’ customary rights. The article shows that the 
international framework supports Indian regulations, whereas the Brazilian 
approach is destabilised by international commercial and intellectual prop-
erty law. 
The remainder is organised as follows. Section 1 focusses on the inter-
national level of traditional knowledge regulations. Section 2 and 3 describe 
the Indian and the Brazilian regulations with regard to their political prior-
ities and their respective eﬀectiveness against the backdrop of the interna-
tional framework. The paper concludes with a few remarks on the prepon-
derance of an eco-capitalist conception of knowledge that undermines 
alternative (traditional) ways of thinking and living.
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1. Traditional knowledge in the international arena
Since the beginning of the colonial era, indigenous communities’ 
nature-related knowledge has attracted the attention of scientists and 
researchers. Based on observations and interviews, explorers like Alexander 
von Humboldt ‘discovered’ new species, which were further investigated 
by researchers in the botanical gardens of their homelands. Botanists like 
Carl Linnaeus developed zoological and botanical taxonomies based on 
the insights of indigenous groups (Brush 1996). While this kind of unregu-
lated knowledge transfer had largely remained undisputed, the interaction 
between local communities and external actors has taken centre stage of an 
international debate since the 1980s (Bastos 2009). 
There are several reasons for an increased attention to traditional 
knowledge policies. Firstly, the research on biodiversity-related knowledge 
has dramatically intensiﬁed since the life-science and agro-industries have 
begun to use bio-explorations as a means to accelerate their research into 
new drugs and farming methods (Dutﬁeld 2011; Pandikumar et al. 2011). 
Secondly, environmental groups have identiﬁed traditional knowledge as 
an important tool with which to preserve biodiversity. Increasingly, their 
conservationist activities are related to climate protections schemes like the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or REDD (Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Degradation) programmes (Debbarma 2006). 
Thirdly, governmental actors from developing countries perceive the genetic 
diversity of their natural resources as an economic asset (‘green gold’) that 
has to be protected from an unremunerated extraction (‘biopiracy’) by 
foreign researchers (Dutﬁeld 2004). 
Discussions picked up pace during the course of the pre-negotiations on 
the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), when developing countries’ govern-
ments and non-governmental environmental groups formed an alliance in 
order to prevent what they perceived as an exploitation of the Global South. 
Whereas governmental representatives prioritised the economic value of 
their countries’ biological resources, environmental groups focussed on the 
preservation of nature as an end in itself. Since they generally approved an 
economic utilisation of biological resources, business actors and industrial-
ised countries abstained from an outright rejection of their claims. Instead, 
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they succeeded in avoiding stricter rules and enforceable standards for bio-
prospecting activities (Bastos 2009: 33ﬀ; Raustiala/Victor 2004). 
The convention stipulates that biological resources and associated 
traditional knowledge must be regarded as property that is owned by the 
nation-state of its origin (Götting 2004). Indigenous local communities are 
conceptualised as ‘knowledge holders’. Although the convention vaguely 
mentions their ‘prior informed consent’ (PIC), it focusses on the commer-
cial exploitation of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge. 
The CBD stipulates that any bio-prospection shall be subjected to ‘fair 
and equitable access and beneﬁt sharing’ (ABS) between all stakeholders 
involved. The preponderance of an economic utilisation of traditional 
communities’ knowledge is inspired by the idea that monetary compen-
sation should serve as an incentive to preserve natural resources and to 
share indigenous knowledge with external actors. However, the CBD lacks 
any indication of how to resolve the complex technical and distributional 
questions which follow from these provisions. The recently agreed Nagoya 
Protocol, an amendment of the CBD, slightly reinforces the procedural 
rights of traditional and indigenous communities, but generally remains as 
vague as the CBD itself.
Indigenous lawyers argue that international environmental law must 
be read in the light of other United Nations resolutions and declarations. 
They often refer to the International Labor Organization (ILO) Conven-
tion No. 169. Although the convention does not directly address the regula-
tion of traditional knowledge, it clearly supports indigenous claims for self-
determination and the respect for traditional communities’ customary law. 
In recent years, indigenous advocacy groups have won another victory on 
the international level. They successfully insisted that the UN Declaration 
of Indigenous Rights (United Nations 2007) endorse the concept of ‘free, 
prior and informed consent’ (FPIC), which also includes the right of indig-
enous communities to decide by themselves and by their own customary 
rules whether or not they want to disclose their knowledge. 
However, the international recognition of traditional communities’ 
rights remains quite weak, for several reasons. Apart from the fact that 
many industrialised countries did not ratify either the CBD (for instance, 
the US) or the ILO Convention (the case of Germany, for example), 
international environmental and indigenous rights treaties lack eﬀective 
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enforcement mechanisms that would ensure the compliance of its signatory 
states. Moreover, indigenous representatives often claim that the interna-
tional secretariat of the CBD supports ABS, but yet does not perceive PIC 
as a substantive clause that has to be recognised as a goal in itself. When-
ever they call for a concretisation of PIC, the CBD secretariat, state repre-
sentatives and transnational environmental groups remain noncommittal 
(CBD 2011). The same holds true for other international organisations and 
mechanisms that deal with environmental issues and climate protection, 
e.g. the UNFCCC or the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
(Thompson et al. 2011; Eastwood 2011). 
Even worse, traditional communities’ rights are seriously undermined 
by international trade treaties operating under the umbrella of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation (WIPO). Of utmost importance is the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights – TRIPS (WTO 1994). Due to the intensive 
lobbying eﬀorts of US and European industry representatives and open 
threads from the US government, nearly all developing and emerging 
countries have signed the WTO agreement (May/Sell 2006). Although its 
wording does not explicitly address traditional knowledge, TRIPS stipulates 
that “patents shall be granted in all ﬁelds of technology” (TRIPS, Art. 27). 
This does not mean that traditional knowledge is directly patentable, 
since it does not meet the necessary requirements. Quite to the contrary, 
traditional knowledge per se is excluded from patent eligibility, because 
is considered not to be ‘novel’ in the sense of an individually account-
able invention (Dutﬁeld 2011). However, the TRIPS agreement stipulates 
a dichotomy between patented innovations which must not be imitated 
without the consent of the patent holder, and not-patentable technolog-
ical knowledge, which is perceived as a public good and free to be used 
by everyone. This means that researchers can obtain patent protection for 
inventions that are derived from the utilisation of traditional knowledge. 
The treaties thus clearly favour the life sciences industries (mainly in indus-
trialised countries) to the detriment of the Southern provider countries 
(Rosendal 2006). 
For almost 15years, both indigenous groups and governments from 
developing countries have demanded that TRIPS be amended to endorse the 
recognition of traditional knowledge related to biodiversity. In 2004, Brazil 
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forged the coalition of the ‘Friends of Development’ in order to advance 
an amendment to TRIPS that would introduce a ‘disclosure requirement’. 
The amendment would request patent applicants to declare whether their 
invention is based on biological and associated knowledge resources. In the 
case of bio-prospecting, they would have to prove that they respected all 
relevant regulations in the source countries. Moreover, developing coun-
tries demand that the lack of accurate, or use of misleading, information 
in patent applications would lead to the revocation of a patent. While envi-
ronmental groups remain on the sidelines, governmental representatives 
from industrialised countries strongly reject this claim. The most vociferous 
opponents are from the US, Germany, Great Britain and France (Inter-
view 187), whose governments are intensively lobbied by their domestic life 
science industries (Interview 055, 063, 420). Under these circumstances, it 
appears very unlikely that a recent resolution of the European Parliament 
(2012) to link TRIPS with the CBD will eventually be supported by the EU 
Commission or the member states in the council. 
All in all, it seems fair to say that the international framework of tradi-
tional knowledge regulation remains ambiguous at best. In the context of 
environmental treaties, traditional knowledge is predominantly perceived 
as a means to preserve natural resources by means of its potential economic 
valorisation. This perspective signiﬁcantly diﬀers from ILO and UN 
conventions, which stipulate the acceptance of indigenous communities’ 
customary rights. However, both the focus on environmental protection 
and traditional communities’ rights are in stark contrast to international 
commercial law, which by and large endorses the economic interests of 
industrialised countries and their corporations. Due to the ambivalences of 
the international regime complex, the speciﬁc balance between the various 
interests in the ﬁeld of traditional knowledge policies seems to depend on 
the domestic implementation.
2. India: Traditional knowledge as national wealth
The Indian debate on traditional knowledge is characterised by frag-
ments of the internationally prevailing perspectives on the one hand and a 
reﬂection of the country’s colonial past on the other. Indian scientists, civil 
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society representatives, and corporate and political actors are convinced 
that traditional knowledge should be used to sustain environmental, 
economical, and developmental goals at the same time (Interview 138, 135, 
143). The eco-capitalist perspective often goes hand in hand with post-
colonial and Hindu-nationalist attitudes. India’s biodiversity is regarded 
as a national asset that has to be protected against the intrusion of foreign 
‘biopirates’ (Interview 131, 134). In this context, the TRIPS agreement is 
often portrayed as a resumption of colonial dictatorship by diﬀerent means. 
Politicians, practitioners and academics claim that industrialised countries 
compel India to protect their industrial inventions from imitation while at 
the same time ‘plundering’ India’s biodiversity (Shiva 2001). Under these 
circumstances, traditional knowledge is considered to be of national impor-
tance (Mukherjee 2004; Kaushik 2004), and its richness should be used to 
compete with the former colonial rulers (Dutﬁeld 2004). 
Indigenous voices are hardly ever heard in the Indian debate on tradi-
tional knowledge. Although their absence is usually explained by a lack of 
interest, illiteracy, and poor linguistic capacities, ﬁeld research on a local 
level reveals that there are many members of indigenous communities and 
traditional healers who can and do express themselves quite clearly on 
traditional knowledge policies (Interview 308, 307). However, they often 
suﬀer from political repression at the hands of the local government, in 
the form of military operations on their territories, and of violent threats 
from private landlord armies. Although most indigenous groups claim 
the right to self-determination as regards their traditional knowledge, the 
major prerequisite to defend their land and life often prevents them from a 
more substantial involvement with what is perceived as a comparatively less 
important issue (Interview 308).
Due to the absence of indigenous voices, the Indian approach to tradi-
tional knowledge regulation mirrors the prevailing elite consensus. Its main 
focus is on the prevention of piracy (Kaushik 2004; Damodaran 2003). 
On the basis of the National Biodiversity Act and the Biodiversity Rules, 
foreign bio-prospectors must apply for a permit, if they attempt to access 
local communities’ knowledge or to acquire intellectual property protec-
tion (e.g. patents) for inventions that are based on traditional knowledge. 
They have to address their request to the National Biodiversity Authority 
(NBA), whereas Indian bio-prospectors can directly refer to the State 
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Biodiversity Boards (SBBs) in order to accelerate the approval procedure 
(Damodaran 2003). The authorities should take into account the objections 
or defences of local Biodiversity Management Committees (BMCs), which 
are supposed to represent the interests of traditional groups at community 
(Panchayat) level; however, they are not required to follow their recommen-
dations (Kaushik 2004). 
Both the NBA and its subordinated administrative units are charac-
terised by serious institutional weaknesses (Interview 133). The NBA itself 
is poorly staﬀed and ill-equipped to fulﬁl its tasks (Interview 137, 138, 144). 
So far, the authority has neither established clear standard operating proce-
dures nor implemented any provisions against illicit bio-prospecting activi-
ties (CAG 2010). As regards the subordinated regional units, many SBBs 
have not been established, or only exist on paper. With the exception of 
Kerala, local biodiversity management committees have been only sporadi-
cally established, and their relationship to other community bodies has not 
been deﬁned for the time being (Interview 141). Thus, it seems fair to say 
that the whole monitoring structure for bio-prospecting activities appears 
fragile at best.
However, at the same time, there is a vast multiplicity of initiatives to 
document and to catalogue biological resources and associated traditional 
knowledge all over the Indian subcontinent (Venkataraman/Latha 2008). 
The most prominent, internationally recognised project is the Traditional 
Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) under the auspices of the Council 
of Scientiﬁc & Industrial Research (CSIR). So far, the project is focussed 
on written traditional knowledge that is extracted from the Hindu reli-
gious writings, but it is planned to extend the scope of the TKDL to oral 
traditions. Apart from the TKDL, many non-governmental organisations, 
corporations, and hybrid entities are involved with documentation activi-
ties on a local scale. In some cases, the projects are ﬁnanced by international 
organisations (e.g., The World Bank), foreign development organizations, 
or transnational environmental groups (Interview 138, 144, 146). 
Generally, the legal status of the various documentations and databases 
remains unclear at the current time (Misra 2007). Whether traditional 
communities’ preferences and their customary laws are acknowledged 
or not, depends on the concept of the various documentation initiatives. 
Many non-governmental organisations, the activities of which are infor-
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mally sponsored by state authorities and/or corporations, completely ignore 
the CBD requirements of prior informed consent and deny any substan-
tial beneﬁt-sharing (Sharma 2006; Interview 122, 141). Some transnational 
environmental groups perceive the consent of indigenous communities 
as an unnecessary burden because of the supposedly superior importance 
of their preservationist goals (Interview 144, 337). Even in those projects 
which are ﬁnanced by international organisations, there is often no safe-
guard mechanism to ensure that indigenous claims are seriously taken into 
account (Interview 317). 
Nevertheless, the various documentation projects enjoy the support of 
most stakeholders, because they serve several purposes at the same time. 
Firstly, from the perspective of environmental groups, the documentations 
are an opportunity to gather relevant data in respect of preservation priori-
ties and climate protection programmes. In some cases, they can also sell 
the acquired knowledge to Indian or international corporations in order to 
ﬁnance their preservation projects (Interview 144). Secondly, the collected 
knowledge may serve the development of local villagers (Gupta et al. 2003), 
a process which is mainly approved by those public servants who attempt 
to modernise the rural society by integrating its population into the Indian 
economy. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the collected data serves the interests of 
Indian corporations, because they can use the documentation and registers 
as a protection against patent applications both inside and outside India. 
As soon as foreign bio-pirates have disclosed their discoveries by means of 
a patent application (mostly in the US or in Europe), the Indian govern-
ment or Indian ﬁrms can oppose their patent claims on the ground of 
‘prior art’, as described in the documentations (Kaushik 2004). At the same 
time, Indian corporations may use these applications as an indicator for a 
promising market opportunity and commercialise the already documented 
knowledge by themselves. Alternatively, they can also use this option as a 
bargaining chip in order to negotiate better contract conditions in joint 
ventures with international ﬁrms (Interview 138). 
Due to the weak institutionalisation of the National Biodiversity 
Authority, indigenous communities cannot expect to be compensated for 
the use of their knowledge in most of these cases (Interview 122). It is even 
less likely to assume that they would receive any support from the authori-
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ties if they decided not to disclose their knowledge. The ignorance of their 
customary rights with regard to traditional knowledge often goes hand 
in hand with a violation of indigenous land tenure rights (Ramdas 2012). 
All in all, the prevailing ignorance of indigenous customary rights rein-
forces the opposition of indigenous groups to governmental activities and 
increases their sympathies for terrorist (Naxalite) groups (Interview 138, 
141), which in turn helps the Indian political, economic, and environmen-
talist elite to justify an ongoing “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 
2003).
3. Brazil: A precarious balance
In Brazil, the debate on traditional knowledge regulation is dominated 
by the antagonism of two opposed camps with regard to the speciﬁc modal-
ities of access conditions. Scientists, most notably from public research 
institutions, perceive biodiversity-related traditional knowledge as a mine 
of information that should be explored in order to enhance pharmaceutical 
and agronomic research (Interview 174, 190). As regards the latter, they are 
strongly supported by the agronegócio, i.e. Brazilian agricultural corpora-
tions, and by the Ministry of Agriculture (Interview 183, 192). Proponents of 
facilitated access regulations often refer to TRIPS and WIPO. They claim 
that the commercial utilisation of traditional knowledge assets could be 
helpful to in enhancing Brazil’s competitiveness on the world market, but 
they also use ethical considerations (healthcare, world food situation, envi-
ronmental needs) to substantiate their arguments (Interview 219, 192, 183). 
To a certain degree, multinational pharmaceutical and agricultural 
corporations support the scientists interested in using traditional knowl-
edge to further research. Large international companies sponsor the confer-
ences of scientists, corporations, non-governmental organisations, and 
politicians in order to inﬂuence public opinion and pressure the Brazilian 
government. Transnational environmental groups like Greenpeace and the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) partially support these moves, as 
long as the demand for an economic exploitation of traditional knowl-
edge is linked to a sustainable preservation of nature or to the mitigation 
of climate change (Interview 196, 213). However, the relationship between 
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Brazilian and transnational actors appears quite ambivalent. International 
environmental groups are often met with distrust, as their inﬂuence on 
Brazilian politics is perceived to be illegitimate (Interview 199). Moreover, 
Brazilian scientists and corporate actors are quite suspicious of multina-
tional ﬁrms because they fear that international actors “just take the knowl-
edge and run away” (Interview 220). 
The rather loosely organised supporters of facilitated access modali-
ties face an organised and strong opposition from a network of indige-
nous and traditional communities. Their claims are not conﬁned to self-
determination with regard to traditional knowledge, but also include land 
rights and human rights in a broad sense (Interview 186). The issue-linkage 
is helpful in forging a coalition among diﬀerent ethnic groups across and 
even beyond the Brazilian territories, since they are closely linked to other 
Latin and North American indigenous peoples (Interview 188, 196). More-
over, indigenous representatives regularly take part at UN conferences, 
which helps to pressurise the Brazilian government. At the same time, 
indigenous and traditional communities are supported by Brazilian non-
governmental organizations and by left-wing politicians and bureaucrats, 
whose political careers often originated in social movements (Interview 
182, 223). Notwithstanding ﬁnely nuanced diﬀerences, traditional commu-
nities, activists, politicians, and bureaucrats within this coalition agree on 
the concept of socioambientalismo (social environmentalism), by means of 
which social and ecological priorities are placed over short-term economic 
gains (Santilli 2005). 
Despite the precarious balance, indigenous communities and their 
allies could beneﬁt from a window of opportunity at the beginning of the 
new millennium. Due to a publicly scandalised case of alleged biopiracy, the 
President of the Republic (Fernando Henrique Cardoso), drew on a legisla-
tive initiative of the Congress which had been already advanced by Marina 
Silva, a left-wing senator and former activist of the rubber tappers’ move-
ment (Interview 182). After a series of amendments, the presidential decree 
no. 2.186/2001 still today serves as the basis for the regulation of traditional 
knowledge in Brazil. It declares that biological resources and associated 
traditional knowledge are state property (bens da união). At the same time, 
indigenous groups and traditional communities are granted perpetual, 
unalienable usufruct rights. The decree stipulates that their customary laws 
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shall be respected in any case of access to their resources and the associ-
ated knowledge (Santilli 2005: 186ﬀ). That is why the Brazilian govern-
ment refrains from a generalised traditional knowledge documentation 
programme, which is opposed by the representatives of indigenous groups. 
The most important element of the Brazilian regulation is the establish-
ment of a rigorous authorisation process for the access to traditional know-
ledge (Azevedo 2005). The procedures are organised by the Conselho de 
Gestão do Patrimônio Genético (CGEN) and the Instituto do Patrimônio 
Histórico e Artístico Nacional (IPHAN). While both authorities decide in 
consultation with state departments, indigenous communities, civil society 
actors, scientists and corporate actors can participate at the meetings as 
observers. Any application for bio-prospection is subjected to the assess-
ment of the prior informed consent of the aﬀected communities and the 
subsequent conclusion of an access and beneﬁt sharing agreement. 
Applicants have to inform the communities in comprehensible terms 
about the research goals, the geographical and temporal extension of their 
project, and expected (e.g. economic) outcomes. The communities are free 
to decide by their own rules, whether and under which conditions they 
agree to bio-prospecting activities on their territories. If needed, poten-
tial bio-prospectors can be requested to hire an anthropologist, who must 
learn the relevant indigenous languages and study their customs in order 
to conﬁrm that the decision to disclose the knowledge is based on the prior 
informed consent of the community. The bio-prospector has to display 
evidence before the CGEN (or the IPHAN) that he has fulﬁlled these 
conditions before he is allowed to negotiate an access and beneﬁt agreement 
with the community. Only if the authorities have also veriﬁed that the ABS 
agreement meets the will of the indigenous groups, is the bio-prospection 
project legally approved (Bucher 2008: 212ﬀ).  
Brazilian authorities attempt to prevent the avoidance of the approval 
procedure by strict controls. In recent years, IBAMA (the governmental 
environmental protection agency) has caused a stir with large-scale crack-
downs on alleged oﬀenders. Additionally, the Brazilian public prosecu-
tor’s department (Ministério Público), the Brazilian military forces, and the 
intelligence service are involved, through the persecution of illegal bio-
prospecting activities (Interview 173, 189, 191). Apart from command-and-
control structures, Brazilian regulations also draw on an incentive system 
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for legal bio-prospection. According to the Brazilian patent law, inventions 
that are based on traditional knowledge are principally patentable, but 
applicants must procure certiﬁcation from the authorities, by which they 
prove that they had abided to the rules of the CGEN / IPHAN author-
isation process. The nexus between patent law and access conditions is 
expected to enforce Brazilian traditional knowledge regulations within the 
domestic jurisdiction (Interview 163, 172). 
However, the enforcement of Brazilian regulations is seriously impeded 
by the context of the international regime complex. While the nexus 
between traditional knowledge and patent regulations at least partially 
deters Brazilian researchers from illegal bio-prospecting activities, multina-
tional corporations are not aﬀected by these rules (Hathaway 2004), as long 
as they do not apply for a patent within the Brazilian jurisdiction. Due to 
the lack of an internationally binding disclosure requirement (see section 1),
they are not required to declare the sources of their inventions in their 
patent applications in the US or in Europe. As Brazilian authorities respect 
the will of indigenous groups and refrain from documenting their knowl-
edge, it is nearly impossible for them to procure any evidence that domestic 
regulations have in fact been infringed (Interview 189, 199).
The enforcement problem has far-reaching consequences, because the 
lack of international acceptance also destabilises the Brazilian regulation on 
the domestic level. Brazilian scientists and corporations rightly claim that 
they are seriously disadvantaged. Whereas they are compelled to adhere 
to strict authorisation procedures, foreign competitors can ignore these 
rules without punitive consequences (Bastos 2009). That is why Brazilian 
researchers and industry representatives vociferously argue for an easing 
of access conditions, even if they admit that the recognition of indigenous 
customary rights should be maintained (Interview 174, 220). 
4. Conclusion
The previous sections show that traditional knowledge policies are 
shaped by a complex interplay between international law, domestic regula-
tions, and local practices. Although the international framework does not 
determine a unique approach to reconcile the diverging interests in this 
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ﬁeld, it oﬀers an ideological base that sets the course for national regula-
tory initiatives through its impact on the eﬀectiveness of varying national 
approaches. 
The international framework is predominantly characterised by a capi-
talist perception of knowledge. This holds equally true for trade and envi-
ronmental law as well as for the activities of the relevant international 
organizations (Zeller 2008). Alternative perspectives, as suggested by the 
ILO convention and the UN Declaration on Indigenous Rights, are not 
completely ruled out, but remain rather marginalised. The case studies 
of India and Brazil illustrate that the international framework still leaves 
room for some ﬂexibility with regard to domestic priorities, but clearly 
favours the logic of commodiﬁcation. Whereas the Indian approach, 
which is to document traditional knowledge for economic and environ-
mental purposes, is facilitated by the CBD and international patent law, the 
Brazilian approach, with its focus on indigenous self-determination, suﬀers 
from a lack of an international enforcement mechanism, which also desta-
bilises its application on the domestic level. 
In sum, the international framework ideologically favours the perspec-
tive that traditional knowledge is a potential commercial good, the utili-
sation of which should serve economic, developmental, and environ-
mental goals. Alternative approaches that focus on indigenous customary 
rights and traditional communities’ self-determination are not completely 
ignored, but their practical application is seriously impeded. While it 
seems premature to assess whether the submission to an (eco-)capitalist 
logic is the only practicable alternative (Harvey 1996), the article indicates 
that further research must simultaneously address both the international 
and the domestic level in order to understand the dynamics of traditional 
knowledge policies. 
1 The paper summarises initial ﬁndings from a research project funded by the German 
Research Foundation (Project SFB 700-TP D7). Empirical evidence was obtained by 
document-based process tracing and 110 interviews in Geneva, Munich, Berlin, Brus-
sels, India, and Brazil between 2009 and 2012. All interview partners were ensured 
conﬁdentiality by not revealing individual names or other information that might 
endanger their anonymity. I am deeply indebted to Bineet Mundu for his support 
during the ﬁeld research in Jharkand (India). Without his help, I would not have been 
able to conduct an in-depth research on the local level. A preliminary version of the 
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paper was presented at a conference of the SFB 700 and at the authors’ workshop of 
this special issue. I would like to thank all participants at these meetings. Moreover, 
I would like to express my thanks to Anke Draude, Matthias Kranke, Susanne Lütz, 
and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
2 This paper focuses on oral traditional knowledge related to biodiversity. While it is 
acknowledged that traditional knowledge is sometimes stored in religious texts and 
may also refer to cultural practices without any natural substrate (Mills 1996), this 
subject matter is left out for the sake of simplicity. In a similar vein, the paper does 
not diﬀerentiate between indigenous and other traditional communities, because all 
these groups face the same conﬂicts with regard to bio-prospecting activities. 
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Abstracts
In many countries of the Global South, indigenous communities have 
learned how to make use of the local biodiversity. However, their tradi-
tional knowledge has aroused the attention of scientists, corporations, 
and environmental groups. Most of these actors only perceive traditional 
knowledge as useful raw material for their own purposes and disregard the 
indigenous customary rights which are associated with its dissemination. 
The resulting conﬂicts are shaped by national regulations and an interna-
tional regime complex of environmental and commercial law. This paper 
addresses the impact of the international regime complex on national tradi-
tional knowledge regulations. It compares the eco-capitalist approach in 
India with the more inclusive concept in Brazil with regard to their respec-
tive political priorities and their eﬀectiveness against the backdrop of inter-
national agreements. 
In vielen Ländern des globalen Südens verfügen indigene Gemein-
schaften über beträchtliches Wissen zur Nutzung der lokalen Biodiversität. 
Ihr traditionelles Wissen hat das Interesse von Wissenschaftlern, Unter-
nehmen und Umweltschutzgruppen geweckt. Externe Akteure begreifen 
traditionelles Wissen jedoch oft nur als Inspiration für eigene Untersu-
chungen und missachten gewohnheitsrechtliche Praktiken zu dessen 
Verbreitung. Die hieraus resultierenden Konﬂikte werden von national-
staatlichen Regulierungen und internationalem Handels- und Umweltrecht 
geprägt. Der Artikel behandelt den Einﬂuss des internationalen Regime-
komplexes auf nationalstaatliche Regulierungsversuche. Er vergleicht den 
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öko-kapitalistischen Ansatz in Indien mit dem inklusiveren Konzept in 
Brasilien in Hinblick auf die jeweiligen Zielsetzungen und ihre Eﬀektivität 
vor dem Hintergrund internationaler Vereinbarungen.
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